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Investment Patterns and Financial Leverage
ABSTRACT
This study Investigates the influence of the type of Investment
opportunities facing a firm on its choice of capital structure. It Is
shown that the more discretionary Investment opportunities a firm faces,
the lower its financial leverage. Inclusion of other possible
determinants of capital structure, such as availability of internal
funds, tax effects and risk, while significant, do not affect the
importance of discretionary investment. The evidence supports (1) the
existence of a moral bazzard problem which inversely relates risky debt
and discretionary investment choice, and (2) a desire by most firms to
use sources of internal funds prior to entering the capital market.
Michael S. Long Ileen B. Malitz
Federal Home Loan Bank Board Georgetown University
Washington, D.C. 20552 Washington, DC 200571. Introduction
The effect of capital structure on firm value has been a subject of
controversy over the years. Most early work, such as Modigliani and Miller
(1q58), showed that when capital markets areperfectand investment policy is
ficed,
capital structure is irrelevant to firm value. Later studies
IModigliani and Miller (1963), Baxter (1967)] introduced corporate taxes
and/or bankruptcy costs in an effort to explain capital structure. The
tax/bankruptcy arguments have been extended by Miller (1976) who showed that
withpersonal taxesthere Is no corporateadvantage to leverage, and De Angelo
and Masulis(1980) who hypothesized that the extent of non—debt tax shields
determines a firm's optimal capital structure. Recently there has been a
movement away from the traditional tax-bankruptcy cost argument toward a
consideration of agency costs as the major determinant of financial
leverage. Jensen and Meckling (1976) showed that with risky debt outstanding,
a firm's investment policy is not fixed. Myers (1977) first recognized the
underinvestment problem by noting that shareholders of'firmswith risky debt
will invest onlywhen (or up to the point where) the expected return on
investmentis at least as great as the promised payment to bondholders. When
the expected return is less than the promised payment, shareholders fail to
exercise the investment option (or invest less than the optimal amount) which
reduces firm value. It is this decline in firm value which limits the amount
of debt a given firm can issue.
Myers correctly identifies investment opportunities, including, for
example, the maintenance of equipment, as leading to potential underinvest—
ment. He notes that owners, by devising complex debt contracts, can reduce2
the effect of potential underinvestment and induce bondholders to pay a higher
price for debt. But debt contracts can be effective only when the firm's
Investment opportunity set is observable.
In this study we show that because intangible, firm—specific, and there—
sore
unobservable growth opportunities reduce the effectiveness of bond
covenants, the only way in which owners of firms with a high proportion of
intangible investment opportunities can control the agency costs of debt Is by
limiting the amount of risky debt outstanding. Conversely, this imp1ie that
if a firm's investment opportunities consist primarily of tangible assets,
such as capital equipment, they can always support a greater level of debt.
The same arguments apply to the asset substitution problem [Black and
Scholes (1973), Smith and Warner (1979)]. While riskier (more capital
intensive) equipment can always be purchased, such investments are
observable. With intangible investments, it is a relatively easy matter for
owners to increase firm risk without bondholders being aware of the shift for
many years.For example, a firmcan concentrate its research and development
(R&D)on projects with a lowprobability of extremely high returns. Since
mostfirms closely guard information concerning R&D projects, this type of
risk shifting is difficult for outsiders to detect.
Thusour major conclusion is that itisthe type of investment
opportunitiesfacing the firm which determines financial leverage. The
empirical evidence supports this conclusion.
Our analysis of the effect on investment type on corporateleverage
proceedsas follows. In Section 2 we develop a model showing the cause and
effect of underlnvestment and asset substitution. We then analyze the
differing effects which investments in tangible or intangible assets have on—3—
firmvalue and present our hypothesis. Section 3describesour sample and the
variables used to characterize investment alternatives, andpresentsour em-
pirical results. Included are tests incorporating additional variables sug-
gested by other researchers. Finally, we present and discuss the implications
our findings in Section Z.
2.Investment Choice and Financial Leverage: Theory
In this section we analyze the underinvestment and -asset substituttpn
problems as they relate to the type of investment opportunities facing a
firm. We show that because investments in tangible assets, such as capital
equipment, can be observed, firms with a high proportion of tangible invest-
ment opportunities can always support more debt than firms facing intangible,
or firm specific opportunities. It is these difficult to observe firm—
specific investments which provide true economic growth and at the same time
reduce financial leverage.
We examine investment related agency problems by considering a firm which
operates for three periods, t=O, 1, 2, in an economy characterized by state
cøntingent claims which promise to pay $1.00 in period t, if and only if state
S occurs. Capital markets are perfect so that there are no taxes or
transactions costs. However, there are agency costs related to risky debt.
It is assumed that some debt is advantageous because of offsetting agency
costs of equity, and that these costs have been minimized so that managers act
on behalf of owners. The firm starts out at t=0 with initial equity
capitalization, an Initial asset base, and a set of investment opportunities
which can be exercised at t=1. The investments which are accepted will
provide earnings at t:2 which depend both on the state of nature and the level
of investment. At the end of' t=2, the value of the Investments is zero, i.e.,they are fully depreciated. The following notation is used throughout the
paper.
=AmountInvested In period 1.
-
(Se) Value at t=0 of a claim for $1.00 to be delivered in period t,
1ff'stateSt occurs, t= 1, 2; S0
q1(S2) Expected (or implied) value at t=1 of a claim for $1.00 to b.e
delivered in period 2, 1ff state S2 occurs and
q1(52)q0(S2)/q0(S1).
Z The unlevered firm's investment problem at t=1.
=Thelevered firm's investment problem at t=1.
V =Valueof the unlevered firm.
V' Value of the levered firm.
Ve =Valueof equity when there Is no risky debt.
Ve' Value of equity when there is riskydebt.
P =Promisedpayment to bondholders at t=2.
Vd =Valueof the firm's debt at t=0.
B =Pricepaid for the firm's debt at t=0.
Sd2
=Statebelow which operating default occurs at t=2.
Sb2
State below which financial default occurs at t=2.
R(C1, S2) =Dollarreturn on investment at t=2, where
aR(C1,S2)/C1
>0,2R(C1, S2)/C12 <0.
It is assumed that the firm derives some level of expected earnings at
t:1 from the initial asset base. However, for simplicity, we assume that
there is no probability of operating default at t=1 so that these expected
earnings, which are the same for an unlevered or levered firm, are ignoredin
the analyses which follows.—5—
TheUnderinvestinent Problem
Consider first the choice of the level of investment for the unlevered
firm.At t=1,owners will maximize their wealth.
=
1+5R(C1,S2) q1(S2)dS2
Thisof course equals the net present value of the investment to the fir at
t=1. The first order condition for equation (1) leads tothe classic
microeconomicresult: Invest to the point,C1, where the expected marginal
return on investmentequals its marginal cost.
(2)
1—1 +
Sd2IR(C1', S2)/C1] q1 (S2) dS2 0
This is equivalent to investing in all projects with a NPV0. The value of
the firm equals the owners wealth in the firm, and is optimal at this point.
(3) V=Ve:_C11q0(S1)ds1+oSd2R(C1', S2) q0(S2)dS2
Now assume that instead of remaining all equity funded at t=0, owners issue
debt which promises to pay an amount P at t=2. The debt is pure discount so
that the amount paid, B, reflects anticipated payment at t=2. Owners use
these proceeds to repurchase equity at t:O, and fund C1 by issuing new equity
at t=1. At t=2, owners default on debt if the return is less than the
promised payment, R(C1,
<P,which occurs in all states S2 <S.Thus at
t:1, whenmaximizing theirwealth, owners recognize that they receive a return—6—
(4) MaXZ'=
—C1+
Sb2(R(C1, S2) —P)q1(S2) dS2
Equation (J4) leads to a first order condition, and thus alevel of investment
C!1, which doesnot maximizefirm value.
(5)Z'/C1 =—1+1[R(C'1, S2)/C1] q1(S2) 2
-a
Thesecond term in equation (5) is less than the corresponding term in
equation (2) since Sb2 >Sd2.Because owners only receive payoffs after they
have paid bondholders, they invest less than the optimal amount,C' <C'.The
value of equity Is then the present value of the shareholders' portionof firm
value.
(6) Ve' =—C'.J q0(S1)dS1 + 5b2
[R(C'1 ,S)—P1 q0(S2) dS2
Since the proceeds from the sale of debt are distributed to owners,their
wealth depends on the price paid for debt. This in turn depends onthe
ability of potential bondholders to accurately assessowners' Investment
decisions, which requires knowledge of the firm's investment opportunityset.
Suppose first that potential bondholders do not anticipate
underinvestment i.e., they assume C'1 =C'1.Then the price they are willing
to pay reflects the investments they assume the firm willundertake.
S *
(7) B p .r
'Sb2'q0 (S2)d32+fJJ R(C'1,S2)q0(S2)dS2—7—
Because they assume C'1 is invested they also assume that the default state,
S*b2 is lower than its actual state, Sb2. This results in a wealth loss equal
to the price paid for the bonds less the true value of debt (B—Vd).
-Thisloss is shown graphically on figure 1.
-
[InsertFigure ii
Bondholders priced debt as If they would receive the present value of area
OABCSN.However debt is actually worth the present value of area OA'B'CSN.
The bondholders overpaid (and transfered to owners) an amount equal to the
present value of the shaded area, AA'BB'. The effect on owners wealth depends
on whether the gain from bondholders exceeds the decline in the value of
equity (area BB'DD'). If owners could underinvest without bondholders
anticipating their actions, they would increase their wealth.
But in a rational capital market, bondholders will attempt to anticipate
underlnvestment. If the firm's investment opportunities are tangible in
nature, potential bondholders are able to estimate the Investment opportunity
set and thus fully anticipate the lower level of investment. They will then
pay the true value of debt so that BVd.
S
(8) Vd'o 'Sb2q0(S2) dS2 +f R(C'1,S2)q02
The value of debt is equal to the present value of the promised payment In
states of no default plus the present value of the firm in states of default
on debt. In this case, when B is distributed to owners, the value of the
levered firm is less than that of the unlevered firm.-8—
(9) V' =—C'1Jq0(S1) dS1 +j0f R(C', S2) q0(S2) dS2
As long as bondholders accurately anticipate uriderinvestment, owners bear a
los in firm value which increases with the amount promised to bondholders.
Tlen it is to the owner's advantage to provide monitoring of investment
decisions. Whether monitoring of investment decisions is provided by
bondholders (through debt covenants) or by the capital market itself (implicit
monitoring), much of the negative effect of risky debt can be eliminatedLow
growth firms with tangible, generalized investment opportunities, such as
plant and equipment can support more debt because of the ability of potential
bondholders to estimate under investment and to observe and monitor investment
decisions.
But suppose that the firm's investment opportunities are intangible
and/or firm specific in nature so that potential bondholders are unable to
estimate either the firm's investment opportunities, or the extent of
underinvestment. Then they normally will assume the worst possible case,
which in the limit is zero Investment. While owners could promise higher
payments to bondholders in order to induce them to purchase debt, Myers has
shown that increasing P is not effective. Because firm value declines as the
promised payment increases, beyond some point, called the firm's debt
capacity, increasing P reduces rather than increases the value of debt.
Further, if bondholders are unable to estimate underinvestment, they are also
unable to observe or monitor the firm's investment policy. Thus the
effectiveness of either bond covenants or implicit capital market monitoring
is reduced. Since the market cannot effectively monitor investment decisions,
it instead limits the amount of debt. Because high growth firms cannot be
effectively monitored, they will have lower financial leverage.—9—
Asset Substitution
Consider the investment decision as it concerns the risk of the assets
purchased. It is well known that increasing firm risk may decrease bondholder
walth while increasing owners wealth. We examine this problem by assuming
that the firm faces a second set of investments at t=1, C"1 with a return
function at t=2 of R"(C1", S2). To highlight the asset substitution problem,
we assume that Cr11C'1 so that owners maximize their wealth at the same
level of investment. The new set of investments is riskier, implying that
5b2 <Sb2",Sd2 <Sd2"and
fR(C'1,S)q1(52) dS2>f2" R"(C'1,S2) q1 (S2) dS2
5b2R(C'1 S2) q1(S2) dS2 5b2"R" (C'1,S2) q1 (S2) dS2
These patterns of returns are shown graphically on figure 2.
[Insert Figure21
Thesecondset of investments results in a higher probability of operating
default as well as a higher probability of financial default. Figure 2 shows
that the expected marginal return on the original investment over states
S2Sb2 (area Sb2ACSN) is equal to the expected marginal return on the
riskier investment over states S25b2" (area Sb2" B'C'SN). This leads to
identical first order conditions for owners' wealth maximization and thus to
the same level of investment. Figure 2 also shows that the expected marginal
return ontheoriginal investment over states 2 Sd2 (area Sd2 ACSN) exceeds— 10—
theexpectedmarginal return onthe riskier investment over states S2 >
(areaSd2 BC SN). Thus, given the above assumptions, the first order condi-
tions to maximize firm value shows that the less risky investment is prefer-
able.
1
The value of equity with the original investment is given by equation
(6). The value of'equity,Ve", with the riskier investment depends on the
returns to owners in states S2 >Sb2".
-
(10) Ve"—C'1 fq0(S1) dS1 +0Sb2,, R"'' —F] q0 (S2) dS2
If the riskier investment is chosen, the value of equity changes as follows.
(11) Ve"—Ve' S2,, [R"(C'1, S2)
—R'(C'1, q0 (S2) dS2
—
0Sb2[R'(C'1, S2) —P]q0 (S2) dS2
The first term in (11) is the difference in value of the two investments in
states of no default on debt and is positive by assumption. The second term
is negative, since owners do not default on debt in states S2 >Sb2if they
choose the original investment. The value of equity may increase if the
riskier investment is chosen. Whether or not it does, depends on the promised
payment to bondholders.
As with underinvestinent, if'bondholdersdid not anticipate investment
substitution, they would assume that the original investment would be chosen
and would be willing to pay,
S
b2
(12)B P jSb2 q0 (S2) 2+OSR(C'1, S2) q0 (S2) 2— 11—
Butthe actual value of debt, given the riskier investment, is
(13) Vd P 0
Sb2,, q02)2 +'0'3 E"(C,1, S2) q02
price paid for debt exceeds its actual value. This is shown graphically
on figure 3.
[InsertFigure 3]
Theprice paid by bondholders is the present value (PV) of area 0ABCS- The
true value of debt is the PV of area OB'CSN. The overpayment (wealth loss) is
the PV of area OABB'. This amount is transferred to owners. In addition
owners gain the difference between the PV's of area DEF and area BB'D.
Finally firm value declines by the difference between shareholders' gain and
bondholders' loss (PV of areas DEF -OAD).Thus owners may gain even when
firm value declines.
But again, in a rational market the amount paid for debt equals its true
expectedvalue; B =Vd,so that potential loss in firm value is borne by
owners.If bondholders have reason to suspect thatowners willmove towards
riskier investments, the price of debt will be discounted in the capital
market.Inthe extreme, investors mayanticipatelosses so great that addi-
tional debt will not be purchased at any promised payment.
Again, it is intangible investment which leads to the problem. When a
firm invests in capital equipment, it is relatively simple to estimate the
owner's incentives to substitute riskier investments and to observe their
contribution to firm risk. This means that it is more likely that bondholders
can accurately anticipate asset substitution.2 But when a firm faces many
firm—specificinvestment opportunities, it is a relatively simple matter for
ownersto increase firm risk over time. Because of the intangible natureof12
these investments, market participants often have difficulty estimating their
risk and return. Further, since the ultimate effect of increasing the risk of
intangible Investments may not be known for several years, It is almost Impos-
tblefor bondholders or the capital market to monitor such Inyestments. For
tiese reasons, we hypothesize that firms with a high proportion of value due
to Intangible investment opportunities can support less debt than those whose
value depends on tangible assets.
3. Empirical Results
We test our hypothesis that a firm's choice of capital depends on the
type of Investment opportunities it faces by examining the cross—sectional
behavior of firms during the period 1978-1980.
Our primary source of data is the COMPUSTAT Annual Industrial File. All
manufacturing firms (SIC four digit classification 2000 through 3999) which
contained a full set of data for 1978—1980 were considered as our Initial sam-
ple.3 Additional data were obtained from the CRSP Daily Return Tape. This
limited our sample to firms listed on either the New York (NYSE) or American
Stock Exchange (AMEX). Our final sample consists of 55 firms of which 139
are In the S & P 500, 216 are non—S & P 500 NYSE firms and 190 arelisted on
the AMEX. We require two sets of variables: those measuring financial lever-
age and those measuring the type of investment opportunities.
Measuring financial leverage is relatively straightforward. Our previous
analysis suggests that firms will choose a capital structurewhich reflects
the type of investment opportunities they face. However, it is well known
that firms do not instantaneously adjust their financing mix to reflect
changes in underlying characteristics. Rather, the issue orretirement of
debt occurs at fixed points in time as the firm adjusts to its targetdebt— 13—
ratio.Thus, the average stock of debt outstanding during anyperiodof time
should provide a better indication of a firm's target capital structure than
changes in the level of debt. In addition, since ourhypothesiscenters on
titéeffectof long term investments on the firm'sfinancingdecisions, we wish
t consider only long-term, fundeddebt. We thus measure financial leverage
as the book value of all long—term, funded debt.5
When considering the effect of investment type on fnanc1al leverage, we
must devise measures which capture the realization that firmsraisecapital
prior to funding investments. This implies that our investment measures
should be current flows rather than stocks.6 In addition, we must recognize
that, as Myers pointed out, all investments are discretionary in nature and
thus may lead to agency problems. But we hypothesize that It is only firm—
specific, intangible investment opportunities which reduce the firm's debt
capacity and thus their financial leverage. Because all investments provide
some growth in the firm's assets, we need variables which distinguish between
growth due merely to expansion (NPV =0)and true economic growth (NPV >0).
True economic growth results from a firm's ability to select investments which
create a unique product or process. Two such investments for which there are
readily available data are research and development (R & D) and advertising.
To capture the flow of funds into alternative Investments, we use the firm's
reported R & D and advertising expenditures as our proxies for firm—specific,
intangibleInvestments, and thefirm'sreportedcapital expenditures to meas-
ureexpansionary or tangible investments.
All of the above variables, financial leverage, H& D,advertising and
capital expenditures, are measured using accounting data. Because there is a
largevariation in the size of firms, a direct comparison of these variables— 114—
isimpossible. To standardize our measures, we use a size related denominator
and compute ratios. Since we are primarily interested in how firmshave
raised capital to fund their mix of Investments, we seek a standardizing van-
able which reflects invested capital. We define Invested capital as the book
vlues
of long-term debt and equity. We then modify this measure by recogniz-
ing that there are several categories of capital, such as R & D and advertis-
ing, which, because of the difficulty In measuring future benefits, are cur-
rently required by GAAP to be expensed. The expensing, rather than the api—
talIzation, of these items is in contrast to the treatment of tangible assets,
which are capitalized initially and then depreciated. Since the items which
are expensed are precisely those which we hypothesize can support little debt,
we adjust our denominator by adding capitalized advertising and R & D. We
assume a five—year life for R & D, a three—year life for advertising and
straight—line amortization. Because the use of capitalized B & D and adver-
tising reduces the financial leverage variable for firms with higher such
expenditures, there is a potential bias in our results. For this reason, we
examine alternative standardizing variables: total assets and invested capi-
tal (without capitalized H & D and advertising). To control for any unusual
conditions which might affect a variable at any point in time, we average our
ratios over a three—year period from 1978 through 1980.
We also wish to consider the effect of' the firm's asset (operating) risk
on capital structure decisions. The traditional finance literature assumes
that operating and financial risk are offsetting decisions, so that firms with
greater operating risk will have lower financial leverage. By including a
measure of operating risk, we are better able to Isolate the effects of in-
vestment choice on financial leverage. We are interested In the firm's sys—15
tematic risk, or beta, which is assumed to capture all of its business or
asset risk. We first compute the firm's equity beta, using the geometric
average of 20 daily returns to approximate one month.7 We then unlever the
b'ta as suggested by Hamada (1972) and Rubenstein (1973) usingthe market
%lue of equity and the book value of debt as a percent of total value to
weight equity and debt respectively. Because we assume debt is riskiess, our
measureunderestimates systematic risk for high leverage, firms.8 We include
the unlevered beta as an independent variable in all tests using individual
firmdata.
In addition, to completely neutralize a firm's underlying business risk,
wealso formequal beta portfolios by first determining the median unlevered
beta.We then list all firms in decreasing order of financial leverage, and
place them into one of' two groups: those with unlevered betas above the
median and those with unlevered betas below the median. Next we place the
first four firms in each group into an 8 firm portfolio. We weight the port-
folio so that its unlevered beta is equal to the median beta. We continue the
process until all firms are assigned to a portfolio. This process, which
creates68 equal beta portfolios, each with a different degree of financial
leverage, greatly reduces the random variation in our predictor variables.
Thisreduction in variation canbeseen on Table 1.
[Insert Table 1]
Table 1 shows that for each variable,, the standarddeviation is lower
whenportfolio data are used. However, because the use ofportfolios results
in a lossof data, all results are reportedfor both individual firms and
portfoliosof firms. Our basic models of the predictors of'financialleverage
arepresented below.16
(114) Leverage =B0+B1(Advertising) +B2CR & D)
+B3(Capital Expenditures)
(45) Leverage =C0+C1(Advertising) +C2(R & D)
+
C3(Capital Expenditures) +C14(Unlevered Beta)
Equation (114) is the model used to test data for the 68 portfolios while
equation (15) is used to test data for the 5145 firms. Both models aretested
using ordinary least squares regression. Table 2 presents the results of
tests of equation (114) using the three alternative denominators discussed
above, while Table 3 presents the results using firm data.
[Insert Tables 2 and 3]
Table 2 shows that, depending on the denominator used, between 35% and
141% of the variation in debt is explained by investment type. In each case,
the signs are as predicted. The results using invested capital plus capital-
ized R & P. and advertising and those using totals assets are quite similar.
The results using only invested capital also are similar, except that the
significance of the advertising variable declines. Because the results are
similar, and because we feel that it is appropriate to capitalize rather than
expense R & D and advertising, all future tests will use variablesstandard-
ized by invested capital plus capitalized R & D and advertising.
Table 3 shows that for individual firms, systematic risk and investment
type explain 21% of the variation in debt. Not surprisingly, the most signi-
ficant variable Is systematic asset risk, with riskier firms having lower
financial leverage.9 All variables measuring investment type have the
predicted sign and are statistically significant. Firms with discretionary17
investment opportunities have lower financial leverage than those facing tan-
gible investments
We now wish to determine whether or not the above results indicate a true
ral hazard problem. It is possible that our results reflect spurious corre—
tion of our proxies for investment type with other, more important determi-
nants of financial leverage. We investigate this possibility by examining the
effect of variables suggested by other researchers on the power of the
-A.
model.These determinants include non—interest related tax shields, firm
specific (unsystematic) risk, and the availability of internal funds.11 In
addition, we examine whether or not agency problems affect short-term borrow-
ing decisions. Because several of our variables exhibit multicollinearity, we
examine the correlation matrices for both firms and portfolios, before
presenting our results.
[Insert Tables 14and51
Tables14 and 5 show that there is a high degree of multicollinearity
between capital exp&iditures and investment related tax shields, which might
affect either the sign or interpretation of the tax variable. However, it is
interesting to note that the tax shield is positively related to long-term
debt.
In addition, a comparison of tables II and 5 shows that when we neutralize
risk, advertising and B & D are positively correlated with operating cash
flows. These correlations are not present in individual firm data. Thus when
we consider the effect of operating cash flow on the power of the moral hazard
model, we might expect different results for the two sets of data. Table 14
also shows that while systematic and unsystematic risk are positively
correlated, their effect on debt is opposite. With these relationships in18
mind, we now examine each variable separately, and determine its effect on the
moral hazard model.
We first examine the effect of investment related tax shields on the
pwer of our model. Expanding on Miller (1977), DeAngelo and Masulis (1980)
first suggested that a firm's financial leverage depends on the availability
of investment—related tax shields, such as depreciation and investment tax
credits. They show that when such tax shields are available, corporate. capi—
talstructure is relevant to individual firms. They argue that the presence
of non—debttax shields affects the extent to which corporations can gain from
the substitution of debt for equity. Since higher financial leverage in-
creases the probability that non—debt tax shields will be lost, they hypothe-
size that firms with lower tax shields will employ more debt in their capital
structure. This implies that firms investing heavily in capital equipment,
which generates large tax shields, should have less debt. We have already
observed that the relationship between capital expenditures and financial
leverage is positive. However, we wish to directly test the effect of tax
shields. We compute the depreciation tax shield as depreciation expense times
the corporate marginal tax rate plus the change in deferred taxes. The total
investment—related tax shield is the sum of the depreciation tax shield and
the investment tax credit.12
[Insert Table 6]
Table 6 presents the results of including the investment related tax
shield in our model. We see that because of multicollinearity, the coeffi-
cients are negative but insignificant. The coeffiecents of our moral hazard
variables remain as predicted and all are significant. Thus while we cannot
exclude the possiblity of' tax effect, we can conclude that the moral hazard
problem remains and is important in determining financial leverage.19
We next turn to the question of whether or not a firm's total risk in-
fluences its financial leverage. Agency theory contends that the higher the
variance of the firm's returns, the less the underinvestment problem. Because
lrwestmentswhich reducefirmriskprovide a capital gain to bondholders at
te expense
of shareholders, owners are likely to forego such investments.
Conversely, because they hold claim to the upper portion of a firm's distribu-
tion of return, shareholders are more likely invest in high variance projcts.
Thus, all other factors equal, high variance firms will lower agency costs of
debt due to underinvestment and thus higher financial leverage.13 If, how-
ever, we consider the possibility that bankruptcy costs matter, higher vari-
ance firms would have less debt. Thus, if total risk has a positive effect
on leverage, we assumethatthe moral hazard problem outweighs the increased
probabilityof bankruptcy, and vice versa if' the effect is negative. If both
problems are important, thenthey should offset each other andthe effect of
total risk on financialleverage should be neutralized.
Wemeasure total risk as the unsystematic, firm specific, residual vari-
anceof the firm's stock returns, standardized by the marketvariance.15
[Insert Table 7]
Table 7 showsthat when using data for individual firms or portfolios,
unsystematicrisk has a significantly positive effect on financial leverage.
We notethat with firmdata,the effect of unlevered beta onfinancial lever-
age is negative. To attempt to determine the overall affect of risk, wealso
used the firm's total variance of stock returns, unlevered to remove the
effect of debt. Our results showed that total risk also is significantly
positively correlated with financial leverage. This indicates thatcontrol of
underinvestment exerts a greater influence on debt capacity than does the in-20
creased probability of bankruptcy. Whilewecannot conclude that bankruptcy
costsare irrelevant, we can state that inclusion of risk measures does not
affectthe ability ofthe moral hazard variablesto explain financial lever—
We next examine the possibility that the size of a firm's operating cash
flowsdetermines financial leverage. There are two possible explanations why
cash flows might influence corporate borrowing.
First, as Donaldson (1961) noted, managers may prefer to minimize their
costs and constraints by using internally generated funds. This is consistant
with Miller's (1977) argument that with personal taxes and no transactions
costs firms are Indifferent to capital structure. If we then introduce trans-
actions costs, we would expect that firms will choose the form of financing
which is least expensive. Therefore, firms with adequate internal funds will
provide most of their capital requirements internally, while less liquid firms
will be forced to resort to outside funding.
However, it is also possible that a firm's cash flows are a proxy for the
type of investment opportunities they face. In the absence of positive net
present valued investments, we would expect that if risk were held constant,
all firms would have the same before tax operating cash flows. Any observed
variation in cash flows can be attributed to variation in economic growth.
True economic growth results from a firm's ability to select investments which
create unique products or processes. When investment opportunities are firm—
specific or intangible, they are more likely to generate positive net present
values and thus higher cash flows. Thus it is possible that the size of a
firm's cash flows is a proxy for firm-specific investment opportunities
instead of growth opportunities.21
We measure operating cash flows as earnings before interest, depreciation
and taxes. If either explanation is correct, we expect cash flow tohave a
negative relationship with financial leverage.
[Insert Table 8]
Table 8 indicates that operating cash flow is indeed negativelyrelated
to financial leverage. In the model using firm data, inclusionof cash flow
does not affect the explanatory power of the moral hazard variables. However,
since firms with higher systematic risk should have higher profitability, we
consider these results inconclusive.
When we examine the effect of cash flow when risk is neutralized, we see
that the importance of both advertising and R & D is reduced belowstatistical
significance. This is due to the previously noted high positivecorrelation
amongthe variables. There are three possible explanations for this
phenomenon. First, because our portfolios are ordered byfinancial leverage,
itis possiblethat low leverage firms have high cash flows, and independent-
ly, havehigh advertising and R & D expenditures. In this case,because cash
flows exert a stronger influence on leverage, the importanceof advertising
and B & D is reduced, but the variables do not proxy foreach other. A second
possiblity is that advertising and B & D create highcash flows and therefore
proxy for the availability of internalfunds. Finally, it is possible that
cash flows are a proxy for all firm—specific investment opportunities,
including advertising and B & D.
Whilewecannot empirically distinguishamong the alternative
explanations,it appears likely that the first is correct and thevariables
are independent determinants of'leverage.Because capital expenditures is not
strongly correlated with cash flows, it is stillstatistically significant.22
Capital expenditues also measures the extent of moral hazard problems and its
inclusion in the model (after the influence of cash flows hasbeenconsidered)
increases the explained variation in financial leverage by 25%. Thus while we
cinnot explain the relationship between advertising, R & D and-cash flows, we
conclude that the moral hazard problem is important.
Finally, we look at whether or not our basic model can explain a firm's
use of short-term sources of funds. If short—term borrowing is used in order
to resolve agency problems, advertising and R & D should exert a positive ef-
fect. But if firms turn to short—term borrowing solely to finance cyclical,
short—term requirements, while choosing to finance longer term requirements by
issuing long—term, funded debt, the effect of our variables on the level of
short—term debt should be negligible. Table 9 shows the results of our basic
model using short—term debt as our dependent variable.
[Insert Table 9]
Table 9 shows that when we use firm data, advertising and capital
expenditures have a positive effect on short—term borrowing while H & D has a
negative effect. Our results with portfolio data are similar, except that
B & D does not enter the equation. In both cases, our explained variation is
extremely small. It appears as if firms make short-term borrowing decisions
independent of long-term investment requirements and do not attempt to resolve
agency problems by the substitution of short-term for long-term debt.23
1L Conclusions and Implications
We have shownthatthe moral hazard problem, which affects a firm's
investment decisions, is a major determinant of corporate leverage. Specific—
a'ly, we developed a model in which a firm'sfinancialleverage depends on
tether it invests in tangible, capital assets or in intangible, firm—specific
assets. We tested our model using both a large sample of'individualfirms and
68eight—firmportfolios formed to neutralize systematic operating risk. We
wereable to explain 21% of' thevariation for individual firmsand141% of the
variation when risk was held constant.
We then examined the robustness of our model by including various vari-
ableswhich other researchers have suggested may influence financial leverage.
Our intent was not to prove or disprove alternative theories but rather to
determine the power of the moral hazard model. We found that including in-
vestment related tax shields or firmspecificrisk did not affect our results.
When we included a variable measuring before tax operating cash flow, we found
that two of our variables, advertising and H & D, did lose power. While we
were unable to determine precisely the relationship among the variables, we
did find evidence that they are independent measures. It appears that while
the availability of internal funds may be the most important determinant of
whether or not a firmseeksexternal sources of funds, the moral hazard
problem can still explain the choice of debt or equity.
We conclude that a major factor which influences corporate leverage deci—
sions is the type of investments a firmundertakes.Given that a firm must
seek an outside source of funds, its choice between debt or equity will depend
in part on the magnitude of potential agency costs of debt. Because of these
costs, corporations which invest heavily in intangibles, such as H & D and2Z1
advertisinghave a tighter capital market imposed debt capacity than those
investing in tangible assets. Ourfindingsprovide direct empirical evidence




1 The first order conditions for the two Investments are as follows.
S2[R(C'1, S2)/3C'11 q1(S2) dS2 0 (A)
—1 +f [3R"(C'1, S2)/C'11 q1 (S2) dS20 (B)
Since the second term ifl equation (A) exceeds that of equation (B), when.the
level of investment is constant the less risky investment is optimal for the
firm. It can be shown (see Myers) that when the level of investment varies,
the less risky investment may lead to greater underinvestment, I.e., area
Sd2 AA' Sb2 may be greater than Sd2" BB' Sb2" on figure 2.
2 For example if alternative capital equipment with different contribu-
tions to operating risk is available, this Is likely to be known and the ef-
fect of the riskier Investment on debt values can be anticipated. Or, if the
shift in risk Is accomplished by replacing existing equipment, It Is likely
that the price paid for the equipment will approximate its true value. Then
all bondholders need be concerned about is that the expected NPV of the new
equipment is non—negative.
3 When there were missing data, the values were collected from 's
Industrial Manual.
Myers has shown that because short term debt is retired prior to invest-
ment choice It does not affect owner's investment decisions. We examine this
proposition later in this paper.
5We investigate the possibility that since agency problems can be cir-
cumvented either by issuing convertible debt [Jensen and Meckling, (1976)], or26
by leasing the inclusion of these items in our measure of debt may bias our
results. However, when we remove convertible debt and leases from our measure
of financial leverage, we achieve identical results for both the portfolios
ad individual firms. —
6The use of investment stocks would seriously bias our results. The
stock of' debt reflects the current level of debt. The stock of investments
reflects all previous investment decisions, many of which were made prior to
issuing any of' the long term debt which is currently outstanding. The .ow of
funds into alternative investments adequately reflects the use to which the
funds raised from the sale of debt were put.
7 Betasare determined using 60 "months" of data where possible. Where
60 months are not available less are used except that at least 36 "months" are
required.
If' debt is not riskless, our estimate underestimates the asset beta by
a factor equal to the firm's leverage ratio times its true debt beta. If we
assume that debt of higher leverage firms has greater systematic risk, this
underestimation is magnified.
This relationship is due in part to the negative bias in our computa-
tion of unlevered beta for high leverage firms.
10 Itwas suggested that our results might be due to a few firms which
have extremely high advertising or R & D expenditures. To test this, we
eliminated firms in the pharmaceutical industry, which have high H & D ex-
penses, and those in the cosmetics industry, which have above average adver-
tising outlays. Our results did not significantly change.
We also examined the possibility, suggested by Dasgupta and Stiglitz
(1980), that a firm's competitive environment determines both whether or not27
intangibleinvestments areundertaken,and its financial leverage. According
to their model one would expect that firms in medium concentration industries
weuld have greater expenditures in H & D and advertising. Sinee these firms
.so face greater demand uncertainty, they can support less debt. We tested
the proposition that financial leverage is determined by a firm's competitive
environment by considering a model which incorporates industry concentration.
We define industry concentration in two ways.First,we compute the percent—
age of industry output produced by the four largest firms in each fourdigit
SIC. We also compute a second measure, designed to reach a maximum at 50%
concentration (100* Concentration —Concentration2).We found that neither
measure is correlated with either the type of investment or with financial
leverage, andthushadnoeffect on the power of our model.
12 Thereare two methods used in accounting for investment tax credits.
The flow through method reports the entire tax benefit in the year of pur.-
chase, so that our measure is taken directly from each firm's income state--
ment. The deferral methods capitalized the benefit andamortizesit over five
years. For these firms we use the income statement value plus balance sheet
changes in investment taxcreditaccounts.
13 Werecognize the potential agency costs involved in the substitution
of the same quantity of riskyprojectsfor those with less risk andgreater
value. However, if more positive valued projects are undertaken, then firm
value will show a net increase. In most cases, the underinvestment problem
dominates the asset substitution problem.
Studies of actual bankruptcy costs find that they arequitesmall and
increase less than proportionally with the size of the firm. For example see
Warner (1977)andAng, Chau, and McConnell(1982).28
15 There isa slight negative bias in our measure. We compute unsystem-
atic risk as the total variance of stock returns, standardized by the market
variance less the square of the stock beta. It can be shownthatall other
ting equal, the change in unsystematic risk with respect to the debt—equity
rat1o is slightly negative.
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- Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
Advertising .0253 .0382 .01402 .0303
Capital Expenditure .09614 .0523 .12140 .02601
R & D .02141 .0269 .0366 .0217
Unlevered Beta .9229 .146149 N/A N/A
Long—term Debt .2506 .11470 .2560 .1339Table 2
Advertising, Research and Development and Capital Expenditure
as Determinants of Financial Leverage for 68 Portfolios
Denominator
________ InvestedCapita









Adjusted R2 .35 .141 39
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Adv CE R & D Beta CF Risk-Tax STD LTD
Advertisig
1.000 —.25LI—.018 —.011 —.172 .03U—.239 .052—.176
Capital Expenditures 1.000 .0011 .068 .368—.116 .671 .039 .i98
R & D 1.000.368 —.091 .023—.022—.115—.270
Unlevered Beta 1.000 •2i1 .238—.007 —253—355









Standard error of correlation coefficents .0113Table 5
Correlation Matrix
68Portfolios
Adv CE R & D CF Risk Tax STD LTD
Advertsing 1.000—.096 .1416 .501 —.215 —.1417 .081 —.487
Capital Expenditures 1.000 .270 .158 .0140 .562 .166 .373
R & D 1.000 .505 —.121—.165 .08.—.359
Operating Cash Flow 1,000 —.268—.176—.125.6L42
Unsystematic Risk 1.000—.005 .239 .3145
Tax Shield i.ooo .033 .378
Short Term Debt i.ooo .319
Long Term Debt i.ooo
Standard error of correlation coefficients =.121Table 6
The Effect of Investment Related





B & D —.870 —2.316
(3.88) (3.30)
Capital Expenditure .6514 2.580
(14.146) (3.914)
Tax Shield —.571 —1.858
(1.140) (.78)
Unlevered Beta —.099 N/A
(7 .62)
Adjusted B2 .21 .41
Absolute value of t—statistic in parentheses.Table 7




























Absolute value of t—statistics inTable 8





Capital Expenditures .851 2.608
(7.72) (6.I9)
R & D —1.235 —.991
(5.79) (1.79)




Adjusted H2 .31 .65
Absolute value of t—statistics in parentheses.Table 9
The Effect of Moral Hazard





















The Effect of Unanticipated Underinvestment on
Bondholder's Wealth
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Figure 2
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The Effect of Unanticipated
As set Substitution on
Bondholder' s Wealth
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